Evaluating the NY Declaration on Animal Consciousness
As we note in a prior Medium article, the New York Declaration on Animal Consciousness was released in April 2024. It is a short consensus statement extending the scope of a prior Cambridge Declaration on Animal Consciousness, by updating the range of animals in which consciousness is recognized.
Declared a paradigm shift in some corners of the media, it is a welcome step forward in the recognition of the subjectivity and agency of other animals. Yet when cast against the backdrop of humanity’s direct experience with animals, as well as more recent scientific and ethical reappraisals of human-animal interactions, we may see the declaration in a different light. Its insights aren’t novel and the action it counsels are anemic.
PAN Works has a remarkably deep bench of fellows with expertise in animal ethics, ethology, wellbeing, and public policy. Liv Baker, Chair of our board and one of our fellows, was the first to respond to the insights and shortcomings she saw in the NY Declaration. We asked our other fellows for their evaluations as well. Here are their responses.
Bill Lynn is the founder of PAN Works
Barbara J King, PhD
The New York Declaration on Animal Consciousness pushes the conversation forward on this urgently crucial topic for animals’ well-being in important and positive ways. In particular, this Declaration is more robust than the Cambridge Declaration of 2012 in its embrace of a wide range of other-than-mammalian-or-avian animals, including invertebrates. For this reason, I have signed the Declaration, but I believe that it doesn’t go nearly far enough.
Regarding octopuses, for example, the New York Declaration envisions “at least a realistic possibility of conscious experience.” Octopuses think their way through bouts of creative and novel tool-using, predator escape, and, at certain wild sites, social signaling behaviors. They flash not only colorful patterns of mimicry and camouflage on their skin, but also their moods. When subjected to unethical experiments — including the one listed on the declaration’s “background” page which includes injection of acetic acid into octopuses’ bodies — — they suffer pain. Similar statements of behavioral and physiological complexity can be made for other animals (going beyond mammals and birds) under consideration in the Declaration.
A stronger Declaration would go further in at least four specific ways. It would strengthen the language used regarding evidence for animal consciousness when the science warrants that strengthening; disavow consciousness research on animals that causes pain and suffering; codify a commitment to assessing animal consciousness non-invasively and in individuals’ natural, wild habitats; and embrace language that goes beyond welfare to aim for genuine compassion and indeed justice for animals too often the victims of human-exceptionalist policies and practices.
Liv Baker, PhD
The recent declaration on animal consciousness, while a step forward in recognizing the inner lives of various animals, notably falls short in prescribing concrete limitations on research practices involving conscious animals.
Importantly, any such declaration should emphasize that conclusive evidence of consciousness is not a prerequisite for ethical consideration. Instead, adopting the precautionary principle and presuming consciousness where there is any indication of its possibility would foster a more ethically robust framework for our overall treatment of other animals. This approach ensures that we prioritize caution in our interactions and care for beings potentially capable of a wide range of psychological, cognitive, and emotional experiences.
This document, endorsed by numerous researchers, acknowledges the consciousness of mammals, birds, and even invertebrates, yet it fails to advocate for a definitive cessation of their exploitation in scientific research. By merely highlighting the irresponsibility of overlooking animal consciousness without mandating a shift in research methodology, the declaration perpetuates a fundamentally welfarist approach. This approach prioritizes minimal welfare standards rather than a transformative ethical paradigm that genuinely respects the conscious experiences of animals.
The absence of stringent guidelines or a call for the elimination of research practices that cause distress and suffering to conscious beings reveals a significant ethical inconsistency. This oversight allows for the continued justification of animal use in research under the guise of scientific advancement, thus undermining the ethical responsibility to protect and enhance the lives of animals acknowledged as sentient beings.
The need for a more radical reevaluation of how animals are treated within scientific contexts is urgent, demanding a shift from welfare considerations to a wellbeing approach that truly honors the moral and ethical implications of animal consciousness.
Note: Liv Baker, Chair of our board, was the first to respond to the insights and shortcomings she saw in the NY Declaration. You can read her remarks here.
Tristan Derham, PhD
A first reading of the New York Declaration on Animal Consciousness evokes a feeling of double-take — similar to reading an article on sheep recognising their friends, parrots solving puzzles, or elephants grieving their lost loved ones. The dissonance comes from reading a banal statement of fact couched in terms of revelation and challenge. The Declaration would be a powerful challenge to conventional beliefs if animals were unfeeling robots, mere automata. But few people outside of the animal sciences really think that animals cannot feel pain and distress or that such suffering is unimportant.
The Declaration carries an odd assumption about the burden of proof. It implies that those of us who believe that animals have feelings and intentions should produce evidence for our belief, or retract the claim. This ploy aligns the Declaration with standard policies of animal experimentation, policies that have, since Descartes’ time, given people a social licence to kill and hurt animals in experiments. The Declaration challenges few beliefs or policies. Animal Ethics Committees can already claim to ‘consider welfare risks’ since, on their terms, consideration only requires standardised inclusion in a process of decision-making.
The Declaration would have been much clearer, had the burden of proof been placed where it belongs, upon those who claim that certain animals have no conscious experiences or that their suffering is unimportant. A more useful statement would have declared that ‘there is strong scientific support for the following animal groups to have no conscious experience throughout their lives: X, Y, Z. This constitutes good reason to experiment on such animals with negligible risk of causing them harm’.
Kris Stewart, JD, PhD
The New York Declaration on Animal Consciousness is a step forward in the scientific recognition of animal consciousness. Although I share my esteemed colleagues’ concern about the potential hollowness of the Declaration, at least insofar as it has been adopted by scientists who continue to engage in harmful animal use and experimentation, I am not surprised by such ambivalence. It mirrors our complex and often conflicting views and values about animals more generally.
Indeed, animal law in the U.S. is characterized by deep inconsistencies and ambivalence, reflecting society’s conflicted attitudes towards different animals. While some are protected by anti-cruelty statutes and welfare regulations, others are explicitly excluded or subject to sweeping exemptions based on their use in agriculture, research, or other industries. Even the federal Animal Welfare Act, ostensibly designed to protect animals, arbitrarily excludes mice, rats and birds used in experiments from its definition of “animal.” However, the breadth of the Declaration’s statements about animal consciousness, which spans a wide range of taxa, challenges the logic undergirding these legal distinctions. It highlights the absurdity of denying meaningful protections to individual conscious animals merely because of their species or the context of their use by humans.
Moreover, by providing an authoritative scientific basis for animal sentience, the Declaration could strengthen legal arguments for expanded animal protections and help to overcome the agricultural, pharmaceutical and institutional interests that have long wielded science to justify animal exploitation. It may be too optimistic to expect the Declaration to mark a genuine turning point in extending greater moral consideration and legal protection to our fellow conscious creatures, but in my view it is a step in the right direction.
Nicole Roberts, MCL
Though the New York Declaration on Animal Consciousness leaves much to be desired in the way of true moral progress for our non-human kin, a generous reading reveals that it does advance the discussion of animal consciousness in one notable way: the Declaration gives us permission to move away from a framework necessitating the “certainty” of animal consciousness as a threshold for welfare consideration, and towards one that refocuses on the “realistic possibility” of consciousness. Though subtle, this loosening of the grip on “certainty” as a prerequisite for consideration is important in three ways:
First, a shift away from “certainty” is much more in line with the way that science typically works. Our world is incredibly complex, and achieving some level of certainty often results in additional uncertainty, as answers often beget more questions. In this way, “certainty” as a benchmark for the consideration of animal consciousness in decisions affecting them is an unrealistic, moving target, and the Declaration was right to encourage a new one.
Secondly, a preoccupation with the black and white nature of scientific “certainty” stifles our ability to explore and utilize other grayer dimensions important to informing our interactions with animals. A movement towards a “realistic possibility” of consciousness as an entry point for reflection opens up the intellectual space and allows practitioners who typically operate in these grayer areas, like wildlife policy-makers and planners, the opportunity to meaningfully engage in these conversations. In this sense, an optimistic interpretation of the Declaration hopes that this refocusing invites a broader range of voices, experiences, and perspectives to the table.
Thirdly, and perhaps most importantly, removing the emphasis on “certainty” frees us to act preemptively to consider animal welfare where the “realistic possibility” of consciousness exists. Waiting for “certainty” about who can suffer and to what extent runs the risk of causing great harm in the interim. The Declaration’s subtle endorsement of the precautionary mitigation of these harms is appreciated.
Ultimately, our words and their implications matter, and the New York Declaration on Animal Consciousness is appreciated for its shift away from a framework paralyzed by “certainty” and towards one motivated by “realistic possibility.” But mere motivation isn’t enough; weaker words in the Declaration that emphasize “consideration” rather than action and “welfare” over wellbeing only superficially address what we already know about the rich inner lives and social experiences of animals, and our ethical responsibilities to them. The area of our work where we do, in fact, need more “certainty” isn’t in our research into animal consciousness, but in our ethical obligation to actually act on their behalf.
Adam Cardilini, PhD
While the sentiment behind the New York Declaration of Animal Consciousness is laudable and the list of signatories impressive, it leaves a lot to be desired.
Like The Cambridge Declaration on Consciousness before it, the New York Declaration seems to target naysayers by providing three inoffensive ‘points of wide agreement’. The first point of the declaration while arguably necessary for contexts simply states the bleeding obvious. The second point does a good job of making itself almost unintelligible by its use of obtuse language. It has at least a realistic possibility of not saying much at all due to its penchant for equivocation. Finally, while the third point could have boldly described our duties towards other conscious beings, it limits itself to admonishing people as irresponsible if they don’t consider ‘welfare risks’ for beings who are probably conscious. This set of points leaves us in much the same place as we’ve been for many years: if we recognise you are conscious we’ll make sure to fill in a bit more paperwork before we do what we want to you.
As I write this I realise I am probably coming across a bit snarky. That’s probably because I know we can do better and those animals whose consciousness we are negotiating deserve better. The fact is that many (perhaps most?) animals were conscious before this declaration was published and remain conscious after its publication. To live well in this world we need to take their lives and wellbeing seriously. This requires going beyond anthropogenic frameworks on welfare, where humans remain the ultimate arbiters of others existence, to recognising and treating other animals as agents of their own lives.
Rick Kelaher, MS
This declaration has stirred a round of public discourse on animal thought and feeling. There are going to be many inside and outside of academia who will unfortunately contest this meager assertion. But this statement is like leading astronomers, astrophysicists, and philosophers conceding that strong evidence is available indicating the Earth is likely round, and should be considered in further research. Animal consciousness, sentience, and sapience are facts and common knowledge, and those who are skeptical about it should be considered in the dialogue like flat-earthers, regardless of their position in the academic hierarchy.
This metaphor is particularly apt because much as we’ve recognized the Earth being round for thousands of years, for an even longer time we’ve known that animals think and feel. Any sense of this being revelatory comes from an academic paradigm rooted in ideas putting the scientist as the only rational agent to weigh the good and harm in a utilitarian equation, which historically has led to both animal and human experimentation of questionable necessity. There is a lack of ethical consideration and a sense of being somehow separate from the rest of society (which questioned Cartesian assessments of animals as soon as they were made). This bucking of consensus on animals by the academic establishment goes back at least to the 19th century when scientists consistently wanted to be the exception to early animal protection laws which the rest of the British and American society adopted and submitted to out of recognition of sameness in animals and humans.
The formula for cruelty is harm exceeding necessity. It’s been established (more forcefully than indicated by this statement) that animals feel the pain and anguish of harm physically, emotionally, and psychologically. We should question the technocrat’s ability to determine the necessity in the present culture and scholarly tradition, and where required, intervene to protect animals from such cruelties, appealing to the public. Animal welfare science began as a way of adapting animals to harmful captivity and exploitation to secure ‘better’ economic and scientific outputs. Recognizing animal thoughts and feelings doesn’t give us a moral roadmap, and despite the coverage, this is no revelation.
Glory Bardin, MS
Scientific evidence of animal consciousness is extremely valuable in our continued understanding and treatment of the more-than-human animals we share this world with. It is not, however, our only way of understanding animals. Our relationships and individual experiences with animals are also important and form the basis for many of the scientific theories eventually put to test.
These experiences provide valuable insights, observations, and context that may not be captured through traditional scientific methods and also serve as a bridge between scientific inquiry and lived experiences. They offer rich insights into the intricate dynamics between humans and animals, revealing nuances that may not be readily apparent in controlled laboratory settings. Those who experience embodied relationships with animals everyday may have a better understanding of their behaviors, communication, and emotional responses through their day-to-day interactions than anyone could hope to create in a “proper” scientific study. In science we must not dismiss those things that we consider “unscientific” such as anecdotes, philosophical ideologies, and “common knowledge”.
Of even greater significance, our relationships with animals can foster empathy, compassion, and ethical considerations in scientific research. An “evidence only” approach removes — or at least makes difficult — the possibility for understanding through our embedded experiences with them. Understanding and respecting the perspectives and experiences of animals not only enhances the quality of research but also promotes ethical practices in animal welfare and conservation efforts.
Anthropomorphism has been the concern for far too long and perhaps we have overcorrected too far into zoomorphism. Acknowledging the relationships and experiences we have with animals we can create a more holistic understanding of animal’s lives, behaviors, and needs. This declaration is a great step forward in our understanding animals but I ask that we do not stop searching for the majesty and beauty of what draws us to animals because of evidence one way or the other, but continue to strive for a more harmonious relationship with our world.
William S. Lynn, PhD
While the New York Declaration is not a paradigm shift, it is a welcome step forward for scientists to explicitly and publicly acknowledge that animals have conscious experiences. Still, the declaration is weak tea — repetitive of previous efforts and innocuous in its expectations. One suspects this declaration was not all it was hoped to be.
One reason this may be the case are the limitations of sentientism — the idea that the ability to feel and have emotions is the bedrock of ethical consideration for other animals. If the declaration has any moral substance, sentientism is its ethical presupposition.
Because of its pre-commitment to a liberal/libertarian-like individualism, sentientism is rightly critiqued for failing to consider the wellbeing of ecological and social communities. Here I’m not suggesting another theory to displace it. Rather, Mary Midgley’s “many maps” model of ethical pluralism is what is needed. Sentience is only one of the concepts necessary to adequately apprehend ethics in a mixed community of people, animals and nature.
More to the point of this statement, the mere recognition of animal sentience is inadequate. Realizing that animals are aware and feeling beings who can suffer and need compassion is not enough to move those vested in the exploitation of animals for economic, scientific or other reasons. Referencing Midgley yet again, we need a more robust understanding of ethics to meet the challenge of animal wellbeing — their intrinsic value, their varied capabilities beyond sentience including sapience and sociality, their moral rights, virtues that contest harm, justice in a multispecies community, and an ethic of care governing our relations with others, human and nonhuman.
With such guide-star concepts in mind, to simply “consider the welfare risks and use the evidence to inform our responses” is not enough. In the future, the declaration ought be strengthened with a robust slate of policies and practices better protecting animals as the subjects of science. A Belmont Report for Animals and International Consensus Principles for Ethical Wildlife Control are a good examples for turning the sentiments of such declarations into practice.
Note: This evaluation was prepared by William S Lynn, Liv Baker, and Barbara J. King. It was authored by all the fellows listed, and Robin Kuehn helped with editiing. It may be cited as Lynn, William S. et al. 2024. Evaluation of the NY Declaration on Animal Consciousness, https://panworks.medium.com.
