The use and abuse of moral theories in conservation debate about killing animals
Contribution to Conservation Biology
by Simon Coghlan and Adam Cardilini
Dr. Adam Cardilini is an ecologist and conservation social scientist focused on properly considering animals in research and society, and is also a PAN Works fellow and Lecturer of Environmental Science at Deakin University. Among many interests and projects, he explores animal perspective-taking as it might impact human beliefs and behaviors. Adam values interdisciplinary thinking and bringing new ethical models to compassionate conservation and other initiatives that center individual and collective animal wellbeing.
Dr. Simon Coghlan is a veterinarian and moral philosopher, and senior research fellow and lecturer in the Centre for AI and Digital Ethics at the University of Melbourne. With wide interests encompassing animal and conservation ethics, Simon’s current projects focus on animal-computer interaction; human-machine relations; digital technologies and animal welfare, and more.
Posted here is the abstract, followed by a series of core quotations, from their recent paper; the full article can be found here.
Abstract
Recent ethical debate about compassionate conservation has invoked moral theories to oppose or support traditional practices of killing animals to protect biodiversity and ecosystems. The debate has featured the mainstream moral theories of consequentialism and utilitarianism, deontology, and virtue ethics. We identify problematic applications and critique of these moral theories in conservation discussions. Problems include a lack of clarity when invoking moral theories, misunderstanding and mischaracterizing theories, and overlooking features and circumstances affecting a theory’s application. A key omission in the debate is a detailed discussion of the moral significance of animals and nature. We then examine the role of moral theory as such in ethical discussion, contrasting moral theory with ethical outlooks that center, for example, forms of love and care. Our aim is to advance the ethical debate about harming animals in conservation.
“Although virtues and deontological rules are irreducible to utilitarian calculations, consequentialism has no monopoly on serious concern for consequences, nor are nonutilitarian duties and virtues necessarily focused wholly on an agent’s moral conduct, purity, or flourishing. For example, a compassionate or beneficent actor can care deeply about promoting good outcomes for others. Indeed, some virtues and duties are conceptually connected to that goal.”
“In our view, the question of the moral significance of animals is fundamental to the traditionalist–revisionist debate. Unfortunately, the recent debate involving moral theory largely sidesteps this question (but see Wallach et al. [2020]). Understanding one’s duties to animals in conservation requires much greater attention to their moral significance.”
“…must one adopt moral theory at all? This raises a deep philosophical question. Some moral philosophers reject moral theorizing (Williams, 2011). For example, Chappell (2009) argues that in providing a “master factor” of character, action, or value, moral theories oversimplify and distort human experience, sometimes doing violence to one’s most authoritativemoral perceptions. For instance, consequentialism may arguably demand preparedness to do evil for the greater good. But Chappell (2009) thinks various distortions mar all moral theories, including virtue ethics, deontology, and (we might add) environmental moral theories, due to their assumption of hegemony over moral thought and perception.
Although moral theories are not worthless, each theory, Chappell (2009) argues, captures only part of ethical reality. Chappell (2009, p. 212) suggests one should be satisfied with “ethical outlooks,”…
Serious ethical outlooks are not chaotic assortments of unscrutinized intuitions; they will possess some unity and generality and be critically reflective. They may also be compatible with or reinforced by, say, scientific and historical worldviews. But unlike moral theories, ethical outlooks do not partly or wholly exclude various other perceptions. Unlike moral theories, ethical outlooks can be harmonious with and even deepened by other sources of moral insight. Furthermore, they can allow new moral perceptions that challenge one’s own beliefs or traditional morality itself.”
Kim Hightower is the associate editor for PAN Works.
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